Editorial

U.S. Double Standards

The new diplomatic offensive launched by the Americans in South Asia, has provoked strong Indian resentment. On America's double standards on terrorism, the Indians are rightly asking--Is US naive or simply hypocrite? The State Department's prejudices against India, as reflected in the recent actions, threaten to torpedo the unrealised promise of closer Indo-U.S. relations.

America's apparent benign attitude towards Pakistan, its extraordinary tolerance of the violation of all norms on terrorism and the proliferation by Pakistan, the meek response to Pakistan's brazen nuclear and missile co-operation with North Korea and a return to the tone of "even handedness" in the public statements, simply confirm the worst suspicions about U.S. intentions. of late, the US has been feeling shy in describing Pakistan's support to Jehadis as "terrorism". It would prefer to call it simply as "infiltration". Americans no longer demand end to cross-border terrorism on a permanent basis. They would like India to feel satisfied if "infiltration is reduced".

The U.S. has also made attempts to undermine India's defence co-operation with Israel and sought to create difficulties in India's burgeoning relationship with Iran, China and Afghanistan. This is being done to appease Pakistan and pressurise India to align with U.S. to fulfill its hegemonistic designs. Ambassador Blackwill, who had radically altered the discourse on three big issues--Kashmir, terrorism and nuclear proliferation, that bedevilled the bilateral relationship in the past, has been shown the door.The apparent U.S. unwillingness to confront Pakistan on any issue raises deeper concerns in India about the nature of the emerging relationship between U.S. and Pakistan. Given the lack of political will in New Delhi, it is true that India's options in dealing with Pakistan-sponsored cross-border terrorism may be limited. Should that become a temptation for hanging on to U.S. for bailing us out? It is a good augury that a serious debate has begun in the country on whether "strategic alliance" with U.S. was in India's interests. The emerging consensus is that it will limit India's options, including military ones, without any great benefit.

To suggest that the U.S. does not have enough leverage is not credible at a time, when U.S. has pumped massive doses of economic assistance in Pakistan and also written off a billion dollars of debt. Pakistan cannot disregard what the U.S. says, as it is so dependent on Americans.

There is total divergence of views between India and the U.S. on Kashmir, cross-border terrorism and global terrorism, Indo-Pak relations, nuclear issue, the role of religious-identity politics in plural societies and the shaping of the new world order.

The US has been playing double games on Kashmir and using finer points to make about the complexity of the Kashmir situation and Pak sponsorship of cross-border terrorism. Its frequent references to Kashmir as a "disputed territory" and inclusion of "wishes of Kashmiris" in any final solution, have only served to stoke the Jehadi flames and accord legitimacy to religious-identity politics, with grave implications for India's pluralist society.

Americans have been deliberately maintaining ambiguity on the issue of cross-border terrorism, refusing to acknowledge the sources and linkages of terrorism in Pakistan or holding Pakistan state responsible for its complicity. U.S. categorises Jehadi campaign not as a threat to the civil society and stability of state but as an instrument to bring India to the negotiating table. By constantly harping on the dangers of nuclear conflict, the U.S., in effect, reinforces Pakistan's resort to nuclear blackmail.

The U.S. continues to pursue 'Brezhinski line', i.e. using Islamic fundamentalist groups for hegemonistic designs. Its concerns on global and cross-border terrorism are only America-specific.

There is a need to evolve innovative military and diplomatic responses to force Pakistan to desist from sponsorship of cross-border terrorism. New Delhi must tell Americans firmly that their advice will be welcome only, when they are sensitive to Indian concerns. At the same time, Indians must engage American public and the business community, to educate them on how U.S. policies were indirectly encouraging Islamic fundamentalist forces. Such forces could strike U.S. interests too.