![]() |
![]() |
LARGEST
CIRCULATED ENGLISH MONTHLY OF J&K
A News Magazine of Kashmiri Pandit Community |
| Home | December 2002 Issue | |
![]() |
![]() ![]() ![]() |
![]() |
Kashmir - the need for a
multilateral dialogue
Premises Dialogue is the essence of open and civilised societies. It is the totalitarian states and the fundamentalist ideologies that promote exclusivism and stifle political, cultural and religious dissent. The ongoing Pan-Islamist campaign in Kashmir masquerading as the 'freedom movement" has upturned the native ethos nurtured over centuries. The gifts of this Islamist campaign have been hate and violence leading to ethnic-cleansing of the entire Hindu minority, all round criminalisation of society and elimination of social and political dissent. Kashmirian society has been pushed back to medieval ages and into anarchy. This is what constitutes the "freedom movement". It is the not the so-called national aspirations of Kashmiris that is under threat but the entire value-system that symbolises a healthy democratic society. To see employment packages or autonomy deals as solution to the continued cycles of violence and Kashmir's socio-political debasement is to ignore the basic issues at stake. Kashmiris need vision and political will to come to grips with the dangerous agenda of the Pan-Islamist forces. The new Chief Minister, Mufti Mohammad Sayeed has been at pains to impress upon the Centre to hold dialogue with the elected representatives of the state. The magnitude and the complexity of the problem demands a wider debate - a multilateral dialogue. This implies dialogue within Kashmiri Muslim society, between Hindus and Muslims in Kashmir, between Kashmiri Muslims and the nation, between Pandits and the nation, between Kashmiri Muslims on one hand and people of Jammu and Ladakh on the other and lastly, between Indian Muslims and the nation. Of late, it is being said, Kashmiri Muslims are becoming tired of the war of attrition being fought in Kashmir. In view of the fluid situation, it is difficult to gauge whether this new phenomenon can be harnessed to smash the terrorist infrastructure. A senior official of CRPF said recently the militants were present in good numbers within the Valley and were still potent enough to carry out deadly strikes. He predicted that "if local populace decides that enough is enough and stop giving food and shelter to the militants, we can assure them the menace would be cleaned up in a very short time." At the same, a section of non-Jamaat separatist leadership has been engaged in loud thinking. In private they have been claiming that they are opposed to violence of any kind and desire revival of Pandit-Muslim brotherhood. This revival, they argue, was key to retrieve Kashmir from cycles of violence and mayhem. This rethinking, if a all it is sincere, is being attributed to a realisation that Kashmiris have failed to garner crucial international support for their separatist cause. Separatist movement is being seen as a part of global Pan-Islamist terrorist campaign. However, there is little hope. The separatist leadership looks confused and repeats the old sadistic harangues bordering on paranoia against Indian state and even displaced Pandits. Pluralism
and Democracy It is imperative that the society, which has itself invited the trouble must go for introspection. A frank debate within the ranks of Kashmiri Muslim society would have to decide whether visions of pluralism and democracy or surrender to medievalist fundamentalist ideology which preaches revanchism, violence and hate are desirable for Kashmiri self respect and futuristic development. It is said revolutions devour their own children Hasn't criminalisation of society, and rise of lumpen gangs, violence against women and suppression of social/political dissent affected Kashmiri Muslims more than anyone else? Who has benefited from the terrorist and fundamentalist entrepreneurship? Today a Kashmiri has lost voice to defend good against the evil. He does not protest against inhuman killing of his fellow Muslims, own kith and kin, brutal slaughter of Muslim women who do not, surrender to fundamentalist diktat or terrorists lust. This loss of faculty to discriminate good from evil is also reflected in Kashmiri's tacit acceptance of the reality of the ethnic-cleansing of his neighbours, the grab and the loot of his left-over property. Jehad has taken toll of accountability and toleration. It is this Jehadist fervor that forces a section of Kashmiris to call criminal gangs of international mercenaries as 'guest Mujahideen' Talibanised culture and value system of pluralism and democracy cannot co-exist. Bangla Muslim society can pride itself in producing a Tasleema Nasreen, who has the courage to write Lajja to depict the plight of non-Muslims and liberals in the wake of fundamentalist campaign. Did Kashmir produce a single 'moderate' Muslim, who would speak with similar pain about the genocide of Kashmiri Hindus? The truth remains that in contemporary Kashmir the distinction between the 'moderate' Muslim and the 'fundamentalist' Muslim has become blurred. It simply does not exist. Attributing this to fear is to engage in semantics. Civil society in Kashmir has to decide how it relates to pluralism, democracy and revanchist ideology of Islamic fundamentalism. Monocultural societies are not only out of tune with the spirit of globalisation, but are self-destructive. Such societies lack broader legitimacy and deny internal enrichment, democracy and accountability. As per official estimates, nearly thirty-thousand Kashmiris have perished in the terrorist violence. Five lakh Kashmiris have been thrown out of their homes and live a state of permanent homelessness. Thousands of widow, orphans, etc. live life as social outcasts on the margins of society in a state of total uncertainty. Minorities, who have still not abandoned their homes live in perpetual fear. Women too have been subjected to indignities, rape and slaughter for standing up to the terrorists' diktat. A sincere debate within Kashmiri Muslim society would also fix responsibility on those who have forced this situation on Kashmiris. Aren't leaders of Jamaat Islami and other separatist outfits responsible for all this? Did not they become willing mercenaries to import ideas and conspiracy of Pan-Islamists to Kashmir? Why terrorist campaign in Kashmir took birth only in 1979, in the wake of Soviet intervention in Afghanistan? The same Kashmiris who took out massive processions to mourn the judicial hanging of ZA Bhutto, later turned ardent admirers of fascist dictator, Zia-ul-Haque. How 'zie koda' and 'zie koan' became 'Marde-momin Marde Haq'. A frank debate within Kashmiri Muslim society would also debate if their was any justification--political, economic, social or religious for taking resort to arms. To what extent pursuit of 'Muslim identity politics' by local pro-India mainstream leadership and later on ideas of Pan-Islamism imported in the wake of 1973 Gulf oil boom and Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, has contributed to Muslim alienation in Kashmir needs proper assessment. Essence of alienation in Kashmir is psychological. The more a Kashmiri feels as a Muslim and a fundamentalist, the more he will feel alienated from secular nation-building model in India. Rigging factor, Farooq's dismissal, bad governance--all these factors have been overplayed. These are part of aberrations in India's political structure and do not reflect any selective bias against Kashmir. Separatist leadership has also harangued that India does not trust Kashmiris and minority groups have to accept the solution, which meets the aspirations of the Muslim majority in Kashmir. They also argue that nothing short of political package will satisfy Kashmiris. This is political opportunism at its worst. You cannot wage war against the state and at the same time expect to be trusted by it. The main beneficiaries of the post 1947 largesse have been the Kashmiri Sunni Muslim-elite, the group waging war against the state. Secondly, it is only fascist societies that demand subjugation of the minority to the will of the majority--the majoritarian tyranny. The essence of the argument that only political package will deliver peace for India is that Kashmiri Muslims demand more rights than others. This strikes at the root of democracy and secularism. The more a communal group is appeased, the more intransigent it becomes. The Central focus of the intra-Muslim dialogue has to be what do the Kashmiris ultimately want. Dialogue
between Pandits and Muslims A dialogue between Pandits and Muslims would have to address the issue of religious cleansing of Kashmiri Hindus, communalisation and Talibanisation of Kashmir's social mileu and ultimately the task of secularization. Reversal of genocide has to be linked by ensuring that displaced Hindus return to Kashmir as a matter of right and choice. In essence it means political empowerment of the minority group. Conferring political rights would help Pandits to a role in decision making and power sharing process to perpetuate themselves. Having gone through the humiliating experience of living as second class citizens, Kashmiri Pandits can no more be humoured by the cliches of 'amanat' or 'tokenist' return to Khirbhawani or Mattan. Speaking about the amaanat" concept", Dr KN Pandita observes, "The syndrome of "amaanat"--certainly a laudable ethical precept in empirical terms--is virtual decree of Pandit's perpetual enslavement. It is shameful for those who offer and those who take". He adds "De-theorcratisation of Kashmir must precede its secularisation....Return and rehabilitation of Pandits can wait another couple of years. But Kashmir's de-theocratisation cannot". Much before terrorists threw Kashmiri Hindus physically out, seeds of Kashmiri Pandits' destabilisation had been sown by the mainstream so-called secular political leadership in Valley. This leadership talked of Muslim identity politics in Valley, while outside it "stood" for "secularism". The pursuit of 'Muslim identity' politics pushed Kashmiri Hindus to a state of permanent inferiorisation Communalisation of the social mileu and finally its take-over by the fundamentalists was a logical outcome of pursuit of Muslim identity politics. This identity politics and misgovernance fed on each other and provided a fertile substrat for fundamentalist and communal trends to grow. Even a partisan writer like Gautam Navlakha, who does not conceal his sympathies for the Muslim communal movement in Valley, concedes, "It goes without saying that the absence of a clear cut policy towards non-Muslims is a short-coming of the political leadership in Kashmir. It has seldom bothered to go beyond the generalities, which only assuage the insecurity felt by Kashmiri Pandits". Problems have only become compounded with the introduction of gun. How difficult is the task of secularization in Kashmiri society is best summed up by Dr KN Pandita. "Kashmiri Muslim society has undergone a sea change with the rise of militancy in the Valley. Born and brought up in anti-India atmosphere and subjected to indoctrination of hatred for over a decade, a Kashmiri Muslim youth is left with very little rather negligible space for maneuvering secular politics. Having linked himself to the radical segments of the wider Islamic world, a Kashmiri Muslim, by strange quirk of unconscious imbalance and the imperatives of buffer psychosis, found himself exposed to the compelling pressures of a democratic and secular political arrangement of larger human society. He is forced to fight a religious war against an adversary that rejected religion as the arbiter. He is forced to lable his struggle a secularist one when it is not. He is not fighting only with the world outside but also with the world within. Without being able to resolve his inner contradiction--an option of his own choosing--he is inadequately introspective of its ramifications beyond the boundaries of his territorial habitat. How would it be possible for him to deal with his Pandit neighbour, who, somehow, denied himself the luxury of contradiction". Whenever Pandits contested communalisation or fundamentalisation of the social milieu or expressed concern over rise of secessionism, they were labelled as agents of India. Even Sheikh Abdullah did not spare them. Thus dialogue between Pandits and Muslims would also focus on the linkage between secessionism and communalisation. The civil society in Kashmir has only evaded the issues of genocide of Hindus or the tasks of secularization. Faced with compulsions of legitimising the separatist movement, occasionally the members of civil society engage in rhetoric of Pandit-Muslim brotherhood, but at the same time avoiding the specifics of return. It is also argued Kashmiri Muslims were opposed to Pandits' exodus and did not approve of it. If Muslims really felt so, what did they do to protect Pandits and their property. Haven't the ideologues of separatists linked return to Pandits' joining the terrorist movement or resettlement of those "Kashmiris", who voluntarily went to Pakistan in 1947. Kashmiri Pandits, who have gone through the experience of tribal raid in 1947 and the ethnic-cleansing in 1990 would tell the change and the transformation of Kashmiri Muslim society over the past five decades. The mainstream politician, cognisant of the ground realities in Kashmir knows well that Pandits cannot return to Kashmir. Since somehow the legitimacy of a ruling dispensation in Kashmir has got linked with Pandits’ return, compulsions for tokenist return have increased. On the one hand, a mainstream politician is reluctant to create a conducive atmosphere for return of Hindus through political mobilisation and administrative action, while on the other he has to answer the nation. If the Hindu minority in the only Muslim-majority state is not allowed to stay, can secular nation-building model succeed in India. This dilemma is sought to be resolved by trivalising genocide and exodus, creating defections and reducing the issue to the return of a few hundred desperate families in camps. Larger issues of genocide, holistic return of the community and its perpetuation are circumvented. Sangrampora and Wandhama massacres were the outcome of this short-sighted vision. Pandits deserve a better deal than role as mere pawns in the game of petty politics. Kashmiri
Muslims and the nation A structured dialogue between Kashmiri Muslims and the nation (civil society and the state) would focus on a) compatibility of Muslim identity politics with secular nation-building in India b) how secular constitution of India undermines the political, social, economic or religious rights of Kashmiris c) compatibility between Muslim identity politics and the pluralism-secularization d) Defining the attitude towards national commitments and Pan-Islamist imperatives e) the future of harmonious religious co-existence in Kashmir, and equal treatment to Jammu and Ladakh. Problems of alienation, misgovernance or particularly democracy are to be addressed within Valley through an intra-Muslim dialogue. Local political vested interest have kept these issues alive to perpetuate Muslim identity politics. Observers have speculated on whether mis-governance was a deliberate option to keep alienation alive. This has been supplemented by a nexus of liberal - left in Indian Civil Society. This section wants to keep the insult alive in Kashmir to force Indian nation-state to re-define federal principles by forcing a shift from administrative devolution of power to recognition of linguistic subnational separatism. In a way Kashmiri separatists and a section of liberal-left are working in tandem to undermine the unity and strength of India. When we talk of dialogue between Kashmiris and the nation, liberals and the left do not constitute part of the national consensus. Pandits and
the nation Kashmiri Pandits on the eve of independence were led by a triumvirate, which consisted of Pandit Kashyap Bandhu, Pt. Jia Lal Killam and Pt. Shiv Narain Fotedhar. This leadership did not have illusions about the ideological moorings of Sheikh Abdullah and conveyed their apprehensions to Nehru. The latter advised them restraint. Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru, despite his failing health, asked Nehru to decide the future of Kashmiri Pandits. Kashmiri Pandits, whose contribution to the nation-building remains substantial observed restraint for a number of reasons. Decolonisation process was on and Anglo-American bloc was trying to destabilise India in Kashmir. The new fledgling Indian state was weak. There were also assurances by Nehru that over a period of time their miseries would end. These problems never ended because Indian leaders lost their track. They talked of Kashmir being secular crown of India, yet they were not serious about promoting secularism in Kashmir. As forces of destabilisation gained clout in the Valley, GoI began placating pro-accession communal groups there, leaving 42% nationalistic minorities in the lurch. Over a period of time pro-accession and anti-accession Muslim communal groups evolved a symbiotic relationship. This had a disastrous impact. It fuelled secessionist and communalist politics in the Valley. As these gained strength, pressure on Kashmiri Pandits and other non-Muslim groups grew. Indian leadership caught in a bind demonstrated neither any vision nor will to break this vicious circle. It showed only its willingness to succumb further. Rise of violent secessionism in Valley in late 80’s is in part a consequence of GoI’s weak-kneed approach and political hollowness. This situation allowed large-scale communal aggression against Kashmiri Hindus in Anantnag in 1986 and total ethnic-cleansing in 1990. Why was Central government totally ineffective in pre-empting the ethnic-cleansing of Kashmiri Hindus? Was not the experience of 1986 already there? And how did the nation react to in its aftermath? The government and the civil society made this major blow to secularism a non-event. Today, the Central government looks with hope the state government’s tokenist return proposals. Kashmiri Pandit community has rejected politics that trivalises their genocide and strengthens communal forces in Valley. It knows well that Pandits can return permanently only when a) there is national consensus that whatever the cost may be, displaced Hindus are to be restored to their homeland. How Pandits are to be resettled has to be decided by them and not those responsible for their exodus. b) it is recognised that Pandits’ right to return is inalienable and not contingent upon the goodwill of the majority. c) there is restoration of peace and state administration is capable enough to protect its citizens. d) Political leadership in Valley demonstrates its commitment to mobilise people against forces of theocracy and communalism. Indian state and its political leadership have so far been engaged in fire-fighting and convey an impression that they have no proper appreciation of the problem. It is this non-appreciation that is enhancing the cost of countering proxy-war. It did not visualise Pandits’ expulsion as a challenge to the country’s secular fabric. At the top of it, obsolete think-tanks, some of whom even enjoy official favour had the temerity to pronounce that Pandits’ ethnic-cleansing was a conspiracy hatched by Jagmohan. What better can be the specimen of national degeneration than this? By endorsing the tokenist return of few hundred desperate families and trivalising genocide, GoI is alienating one of the most patriotic groups in the country. Between Kashmiris and People and Jammu and Ladakh To keep proaccession communal groups in Valley in good humour, Indian leadership abandoned nationalistic groups and made them hostage to ‘Muslim Identity’ Politics. It accepted the separatist Article 370 and the principle of Muslim precedence. Exchisivist politics came to be seen as politically correct, while nationalist politics became a taboo in the political landscape of J&K. Jammu and Ladakh became colonies of Kashmir while Kashmiri Pandits were thrown into the political Junkyard. If Kashmiri leadership is sanguine that J&K should stay as one entity, then regional discrimination has to go. A section of Indian intellectuals are by design trying to perpetuate enslavement of these non-Kashmiri regions. Healthy demands of equity in economic and political participation are being dubbled by them as extension of Dixon Plan and Hindu fundamentalist game. Autonomy based on religious precedence is being articulated as consistent with ‘national’ aspirations of Kashmiris. Any solution to Kashmir imbroglio has to be a secular one that recognises the aspirations of all ethnic and religious groups. Between
Indian Muslims and the nation Indian Muslim leadership cannot absolve itself of its responsibility when Islamist terrorists are trying to undermine the sovereignty of India and principles of secular nation-building. Muslims are India’s largest minority. Who should have more stakes in India’s secular nation-building than Indian Muslims? No section of Indian Muslim leadership from fundamentalist to Marxist has tried to present Pandits’ ethnic-cleansing in perspective or argued for their return as a matter of right and choice. No Muslim leader or academician in India has stood up to the communalisation and talibanisation of Kashmir’s social mileu and taking over of the forces of intolerance. Instead most of these leaders are trying to justify support for communally motivated autonomy demand at national level. One of the senior leaders was even a signatory to the dangerous resolution drafted at the symposium “Kashmir: the need for a bold initiative”, held at Taj Hotel, Mumbai in June 1990. Muslim leaders are also silent on how anti-national elements are using madrassas. The nation wants to know why Muslim leadership is reluctant to support those proposals which hold to potentiality of promoting pluralism secularism and participatory democracy in J&K.
|
![]() |
|
|