The Crisis in Kashmir: An American Indian Perspective

Secessionist violence in Kashmir represents a major challenge to the stability of the Indian nation state. It is a direct assault on two significant features of Indian polity - democracy and secularism.. In terms of security forces deployment it is India’s largest and most significant counter-insurgency to date. The expulsion of the entire Hindu community through a process of ethnic-cleansing has put a question  mark over the future of secularism in India. How India responds to decisively defeat the forces of violence and communalism in Kashmir will have profound bearing on future of democracy and secularism as vital ingredients in nation-building exercise.

Indian political leadership, during the past thirteen years, has blundered too often in handling the insurgency in Kashmir. Lack of vision and political will besides the manipulative role played by international agencies and country’s corrupt decadent metropolitan elite have thwarted all positive initiatives. Opportunities turned into liabilities.

What has led to the snowballing of the fundamentalist rebellion in Valley? Is rise of separatist sentiment only a recent arrival? Who is the Villain in the entire drama? All this has baffled scholars, politicians and the people alike. Much of the scholarship on Kashmir remains prejudiced, polemical, incomplete and self-serving. No one seems to be interested in addressing the fundamentals. Harangues on alienation and victim-hood of Kashmiri Muslims pass as serious scholarship. All this has served to obfuscate the real issue at stake - Kashmir’s survival as a democratic and secular society.

The crisis in Kashmir by Sumit Ganguly is another addition to this skewed scholarship on Kashmir. Published as a part of Woodrow Wilson Center series, this volume does not add something, which is not known. It hashes and rehashes the old formulations in a new package. At times these formulations seem too simplistic. Mere linking the rise of insurgency to so-called second wave of ethnolinguistic assertion in India or the curbing of democratic dissent does not explain the evolution of insurgency or its social and political content. This book enjoys considerable exposure in the US media for the only reason that the author underplays Pakistan’s role in stoking the insurgency and advocates conferring protectorate status on Kashmir as a solution to the impasse.

Legacy of Muslim Question:

Terrorist campaign in Kashmir can be better understood if it is situated in the context of the Muslim question and not the national question. In the Leninist sense there is no national question in India. There is no dominant nationality, which oppresses other national groups. Neither before 1947 or after it has self-determination ever been on the agenda of the political emancipation movements of Indian people. Colonial policies pursued by the British to consolidate their rule weakened the basis of linguistic subnationalism but strengthened religious sub-nationalism. The Muslim question is a legacy of British Colonial rule.

Would Kashmir have responded the same way with federal Centre had it been a Hindu-majority region? What would have been the Contours of Kashmiriat then?

The main challenges to Indian unity have surfaced in those peripheral border regions, where the dominant social group is also a national religious minority. Even in case of Punjab, majority of the Sikhs did not feel fundamentally alienated from the Indian state. They had specific grievances against Congress and the Central government. In North-East twin process of underdevelopment and modernisation superimposed on the tribal nature of society fuelled the revolt. Christian missionary zealots and the external agencies played no less role in converting routine discontent into full-blown rebellion. Similarly failure of Indian state to check demographic invasion by Bangladeshi Muslims turned a section of Assamese against Delhi.

Limitations of Ethnic Muslim Nationalism

Fundamentalist insurgency in Kashmir is a consequence of a complex interplay of internal and external factors. Inherent contradictions in ethnic Muslim nationalism influenced the political line of National Conference, the premier political organisation of Kashmiris. Its ambignity towards secession and anti-secular character need to be studied in this context. Subsequent role of Sheikh Abdullah and National Conference i.g loud thinking on “Independence”, launching of Plebiscite Front, hobknobbings with Jamaat Islami, hostile attitude towards Kashmiri Pandits and people of Jammu and Ladakh are an extension of this political line. Intra - Muslim conflict between rural and urban sections or aspiring and ruling middle class would not have led to insurgency had not the 1973 oil boom in Gulf and Soviet intervention in Afghanistan created the ideological and politico-military infrastructure. The role of Americans and Pakistan has also been critical to the emergence of secessionist movement. US has been guilty on many counts. Its  map-making intrigues on Kashmir, raising doubts about accession, raking up bogey of human rights’ excesses, conniving in Pakistan’s blackmail on war and stalling effective action against terrorists or terrorist bases in PoK, are direct incitement to terrorists to carry on the campaign. Pakistan’s blatant sponsorship of cross-border terrorism has made Kashmir impervious to resolution at least, in the short term. ‘Militancy is on last legs’ or attributing terrorist acts to desperation do not reflect reality on the ground. It has to be a long haul in Valley. Successful Indian strategy would have to address reducing the costs of fighting proxy-war by localising the arena of conflict, denying the hideout to subversives and raising stakes constantly for Pakistan to force it to abandon the proxy-war. At the international level, Indian diplomats need to link resolution of Kashmir issue with the secular principle and highlight the multi-ethnic, multireligious character of society in J&K.

The inherent limitations in the secular and nationalistic character of National Conference made separatism a perpetual phenomenon since 1948. Its leadership headed by Sheikh Abdullah and Mirza Afzal Beg promoted Muslim identity at the cost of secular identity. Generations of Kashmiris were brought up on the politics of Plebiscite and Muslim exclusivist identity. How could secular institutions or opposition be nurtured in this atmosphere? Jamaat Islami only added a fundamentalist hue to what Sheikh Abdullah and his National Conference were preaching. In 1965 the leadership of Ghulam Sadiq more than anything else was responsible for defeating the Pak game. He never wavered in his commitment to Indian Unity. On the contrary, Sheikh Abdullah, who knew about Operation  Gibraltor as per recent disclosures, did not take Indian leadership in confidence.

Sumit Ganguly’s study lacks historical perspective and is poor in analysis. It remotely touches the issues/phenomena linked with rise of fundamentalist violence in Kashmir. To him the rise of this sentiment is a recent development and pacification of ‘disgruntled’ Kashmiris the only issue at stake. His whole analysis is reduced to one argument that insurgency is product of political mobilisation and institutional decay. He argues that as part of wooing strategy the Indian state went out of way to expand literacy, mass and higher education in J&K. This process produced a generation of politically knowledgeable and “sophisticated” Kashm-iris. Simultaneously, the national government, fearful of potential secessionist proclivities among the Kashmirs, systematically stultified the development of political institutions in the state. Unable to express dissent in an institutional context, the new generation of Kashmiris resorted to violence. Even the rise of indigenous Islamist movement he attributes simply to a conspiracy by immigrant Bangladeshi and Assemese Moulvis. Prof. Mustafa  Kamal Pasha’s work on this dimension seems more convicting.

Rigging Factor

Rigging factor has been overplayed in Kashmir, and invariably the blame has been laid at Centre. It is strong competitive politics that generates accountability. Sheikh Abdullah’s organisation, National Conference stood aloof from electoral politics till 1975 and championed the separatist politics of plebiscite. In 1977 and 1983 Centre did not create any obstacles for NC’s return to power. In fact in these competitive elections, it were the minority groups that were sidelined through fraudulent delimitation, rigging and physical harassment. If curbing of democratic dissent and rigging were enough justification for resorting to violence, the minority groups should have been up in arms.

Dismissal of Farooq Abdullah government in 1984 or rigging in 1987 elections need to be seen in the context of launching of ‘Operation Topac’ by ISI in 1979. Hype on greater autonomy or moving of Resettlement Bill were not isolated acts. These motivated agendas had serious ramifications for national security. ISI as part of ‘Operation Topac’, was trying to cultivate politicians and members of bureaucracy for smooth-sailing of the plan. There were strong allegations that NC leadership was hob-nobbing with Sikh extremists in Punjab and a training camp was held at Shaja Marg (Pulwama). Mysterious agencies and people visited the state during this period and had access to the highest authorities. Senior Ministers in Abdullah’s cabinet were issuing provocative statements against tiny minority of Kashmiri Hindus. Army generals were publicly saying that their sources on the border were drying up due to political-bureaucratic interference. As per media reports, even General Hamid Gul, the then ISI chief is alleged to have visited J&K a number of times. At a seminar in Srinagar Club in September 1989, the man to whom Sheikh Abdullah dictated his memoirs stunned the audience by claiming, “Agar Sheikh Sahib Zinda Hoteh Voh Jail Meh Hoteh”.. What was the state government doing to foil ISI’s gameplan? It is true that installation of GM Shah was a remedy worse than the disease, but many would agree that continuation of Farooq Ministry was not in national interest then.

In 1987 elections, MUF game was not to test the fairness of elections. As part of Pak game-plan its design was to capture power for administrative subversion. It openly exploited religious sentiments and harassed its opponents/minority groups. Even MUF leadership in private said that it could not win more than twelve seats in a fai election. Ganguly fails to locate the causes of 1984 and 1987 episodes and blames Mrs. Gandhi for playing a game of one upmanship against Farooq Abdullah. Referring to Farooq Abdullah’s meeting with Bhindrawn Wale, Ganguly apologetically comments, “The meeting took place during a ceremonial visit that he had paid to the Golden Temple in Amritsar. It lasted all of fifteen minutes. The symbolism of the meeting, however, was infelicitous. At that time it was well known to all political observers in India that Bhindran Wale had close links with various secessionist Sikh groups in the Punjab.”

Fundamentalist Generation

Kashmir’s new generation of youth in late 70’s and 80’s grew under the shadow of Zia’s Islamisation programme in Pakistan, Khomeinist revolution and militarised Pan-Islamist movements in the Muslim world. This generation was fundamentalist to the core and detested secularism in any form. It was strongly anti-Hindu, Jehadist in outlook and disliked democracy or democratic institutions. It was inspired by the Jehadist dream of carving out a new Islamist caliphate extending from Turkey to Indonesia. Ganguly does not address this and resorts to polemics, “More disturbing, the domestic gains of the 1971 war were also frittered away. The 1975 Beg-Parthasarthi Accord, despite all its limitations, could have placed the Central government’s relations with Kashmir on a more secure footing. Unfortunately, even the limited provisions of the accord were never implemented... In the background of this political scene, Kashmiris were becoming better educated and more politically aware...Finding virtually all institutional channels of expressing their discontent closed, they mobilised and resorted to other, more violent methods of protest. Since secular politics, as represented by the NC was corrupt and undemocratic, it is not surprising that the movement took on an ethnoreligious dimension". This generation which imbibed the retograde ideology of theo-fascism is described by Ganguly as "politically knowledgeable" and " sophisticated". New youth's utter contempt for democratic dissent was indicative from attacks on communist leaders, Mr HK Surjeet in Khanyar (1982) and Mr HN Wanchoo in Batmaloo (1984). These youth would often convert agitations on Price-Rise or against raised Power tariff into communal or secessionist issues. The new Muslim youth opposed democratic movements in Pakistan and endorsed fascist military junta and Jehadi elements. On the middle-east these youth did not identify with secular movements led by Palestinians or other democratic elements.

The rise of this generation on Kashmir's political scene was a direct threat to pluralistic co-existence. Attacks on Pandits in 1986 or subsequent ethnic-cleansing was a logical corollary of the politics these youth practised. In a guarded defence of these revanchist elements, Ganguly comments, "As law and order in Kashmir deteriorated, relations between members of the minority Pandit (Hindu) community and their Muslim Counterparts in the Valley started to fray. Historically, unlike other parts of India, Kashmir had not been witness to widespread communal tension and violence. However, two factors undermined sense of security and safety of the Pandit community in Kashmir. First, the governor hinted that the safety and security of the Hindu community could not be guaranteed. Second, the fanatical religious zeal of some of the insurgent groups instilled fear among the Hindus of the Valley".

The author attributes the ethnoreligious mobilisation to four factors--predominantly Muslim character of Valley, the geographical isolation of Valley which insulated Kashmiri Islam from larger currents of Muslim politics in India, failure of secular politics and lastly the role of Pakistan in fomenting subversion. These arguments look incomplete. Right since 1930 Kashmir's mainstream political mobilisation has been along ethno-communal lines. It never allowed secular politics or institutions to flourish. The author's observation seems to be off the mark, when he comments, "since secular politics, as represented by the NC, was corrupt and undemocratic, it is not surprising that the movement took an ethnoreligious dimension". The premise itself is wrong, as NC never subscribed to secular politics. The politics of autonomy, regional autonomy report or the Resettlement Bill negate the essence of secularism.

Indian state too contributed to the mess. It appeased too often the Muslim communal groups in Kashmir and lapped up communal-secessionist agendas as commitments made by the nation. The Indian leadership undermined the position of nationalistic groups in the state and discouraged patriotic elements among Kashmir Muslims, who were willing to contest the separatist politics.

Sumit Ganguly refers to Bhutto-Swaran Singh talks at length. He says Nehru called off  these talks when Indian was handed an Anglo-American proposal, demanding giving up substantial portions of the Kashmir valley to Pakistan, besides total autonomy to the remaining portion. Bakshi Gh. Mohd's role during this period and subsequently his removal under Kamraj Plan has also not been dealt.

The author ascribes "Operation Gibralter" to three miscalculations by Pakistan. First, in the wake of Nehru's death, the potential for disintegration in India was great. Second, on the basis of the popular discontent in the aftermath of the Hazratbal episode, Pakistan believed that widespread pro-Pakistani sentiment existed in the Valley. Third, bizarre, and essentially racist notion of the inherent martial prowess of the Pakistani  (Muslim) army. Ganguly's observations on the Hazratbal Episode (1963) and Sheikh Abdullah's role during the crucial years 1962-1965, look commonplace. Why was Sheikh adopting an increasingly intemperate and, on occasion, even taking on a communal tenor in his public speeches? Ganguly's argument is reductionist. He remarks that Abdullah's attempts to generate widespread dissatisfaction against Sadiq regime were prompted by a desire to oppose greater integration with India. It may be recalled first Youth League and then Al-Fatah armed outfits were launched, some say, with blessings from Plebiscite Front leadership, to stoke subversion in 60's.

1971 War and its Aftermath

The outcome of the 1971 war had significant consequences for the Kashmir dispute. The author sums up the gains - it significantly undermined the Pakistani irredentist claim on Kashmir; with the breakup of Pakistan, the emergent structure of power on the sub-continent now dramatically favoured India; there was little or no opportunity for Pakistan to exploit the situation in Kashmir and lastly, the Simla Agreement addressed one of India's long-standing concerns - de-internationalisation of the Kashmir dispute. Though GoI failed to get Pakistan around for accepting LoC as international border, the Simla Agreement's explicit recognition of the principle of bilateralism in Indo-Pakistani relations was widely construed in Indian policy-making circles as a major diplomatic victory. India's problems were further eased by other related developments. Political developments in Pakistan increasingly drew Bhutto's attention away from Kashmir. Insurgency in Baluchistan and ethnic violence in Sind left him little time for Kashmir. With the quadrupling of oil prices in 1973 in the wake of the third Arab-Israeli conflict, relations with the Arab Middle East States and Iran became important concerns for Pakistan. But this shift in Pakistan's foreign policy concerns and priorities and India's brief sense of euphoria as the emergent great power in the region made India complacent to internal security, particularly in Kashmir.

About Rubiya Sayed episode, the author says that the release of militants signalled to the insurgent groups in Valley that the new government "lacked the necessary discipline to stand firm when confronted by an act of terror." He adds the government of VP Singh failed to fashion a coherent strategy to deal with the emerging political crisis in Kashmir. This major failure he attributes to two factors. At the national level, VP Singh government remained preoccupied with imperatives of political survival. At the state level, Farooq Abdullah appeared at a complete loss to curb the growing lawlessness and violence.

Ganguly's observations on Jagmohan's tenure are that his "iron-hand" strategy "proved to be costly from the outset but had only very limited success in blunting the insurgency". About Kunan-Poshpora, he remarks, "the true story may never be unraveled. The villagers' accounts cannot be accepted as completely reliable because they are riddled with inconsistencies. The Press Council report appears too ready to grant the army the benefit of the doubt".

The handling of the Chrar-e-Sharief episode, Ganguly says, from its start to its tragic end, revealed the lack of a clear-cut set of procedures and directives for dealing with such a crisis, though there was no lack of precedent. He explains the fiasco at Chrar-e-Sharif as, "the blame cannot be placed on the tactics adopted by the army and the BSF. Rather, civilian authorities in Srinagar and New Delhi were at fault". "Strangely enough, Ganguly describes GoI's willingness to dilute sovereignty over Kashmir "as the only positive development that ensued in the wake of the destruction of the shrine". The author refers to a little known fact that Qazi Nissar was assassinated because he had accepted the role of intermediary to seek release of son of David Housego, the former correspondent of the Financial Times In India. There are references to Chavan-Pilot feud and Sheikh Abdullah's authoritarian style.

Conclusions

What are the prospects for this fundamentalist insurgency to succeed? Ganguly believes it is highly unlikely that the insurgents can prevail on the battle-field or can effectively obtain the intervention of the international community. India's staying power on the ground in Kashmir is inestimable. The Indian state has historically fought and successfully fended off previous challenges to its integrity even at a time when it possessed significantly less coercive power. However, he hastens to add the continued sanguinary conflict in Kashmir may indeed be extremely corrosive to the ethos of the Indian army, not to mention the paramilitary forces.

Ganguly concedes that the overwhelming opinion in India feels that the government has not responded with sufficient vigor in dealing with the insurgents or their principal supporter, Pakistan. There are compelling reasons why India will not concede Kashmir. First, virtually all Indians Consider Kashmir to be a part of India. The Kashmiri insurgent claim of national self-determination, if allowed to prevail, could lead to disintegration of the Indian state. The demonstration effects of Kashmir seceding from India would be profound. Second, Ganguly says, the secession of Kashmir would unwittingly implicate the remaining Muslim population in India, Third, the insurgent claim for self-determination is itself prolematic. The vast majority of the insurgents would not extend the privilege of self-determination to members of other communities.

The author discusses various strategies and options to resolve the crisis. He refers to Ethnic flooding, the Mailed-Fist strategy, The Wear-Down option, conceding the Valley, Shared Sovereignty, Holding Plebiscite, Independence, The Protectorate Option etc.. He says given India's unhappy experience with the Kashmir issue at the UN, it is doubtful that India will allow the issue to be internationalised. The best hope for the redressal of the grievances of all minorities, Ganguly remarks, remains within the ambit of a secular, democratic, and federal Indian polity.

*The Crisis in Kashmir

Author: Sumit Ganguly

Price: Rs 395-00

Published: Foundation Books

By 4764/2A, 23 Ansari Road,  Daryaganj, New Delhi-110002

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