Kashmir

By Shamim Ahmed Shamim

The accord that took place between Mrs. Gandhi and Sheikh Abdullah in February 1975 after two years' prolonged parleys, marks a watershed in the politics, if not the history, of the state. The arrest of Sheikh Abdullah in 1953, his imprisonment, subsequent externment, and declaring the Plebiscite Front an unlawful party had not only eroded the legitimacy of the accession but cast a shadow on the democratic institutions and the functioning of democracy in the country. Undoubtedly the use of force, repression and other unlawful practices had started in the Sheikh's regime itself in the 1951 State Assembly elections. But, after 1953, what passed under the pretence of elections in the State, and the manner in which the country's political parties and national press entered into a conspiracy of silence, accepting the suppression of justice, democracy and moral values as an unpalatable yet inevitable reality, left an indelible stigma on the fabric of Indian democracy.

I am firm in my opinion that all the experiments put to use in other parts of the country to pervert the electoral process with the help of government machinery, political repression and money power, were initially tried and tested in the laboratory of Kashmir. The repeated use of these reprehensible devices so dulled our democratic sensibility that the clamping down of internal emergency became not only possible but also acceptable, at least during the earlier phase. The facade of Assembly elections in 1951 and then bypassing the same Assembly in 1953, deposing and arresting Sheikh Abdullah, signalled the starting point of a journey which twenty two years later finally culminated in overwhelming the nation with an internal emergency.

Against such a back-drop, the Indira-Addullah accord of February 1975, was a significant step towards normalising the political process in the State; and Mrs. Gandhi quite rightly deserves kudos and credit for this act of statesmanship and farsightedness. Without conceding a single demand, she persuaded the Sheikh to accept the Chief Ministership of the State on Congress support.

Having remained in political wilderness for 22 years, Sheikh Abdullah, accepting the realities of the situation, renounced the slogan of self-determination, plebiscite and demand for restoration of the 1953 status of the state. For some time, however, he stubbornly insisted that he should be called the Prime Minister instead of the Chief Minister. Mrs. Gandhi granted it partially, allowing him to call himself Prime Minister if he so wished, but making it clear that the Centre would refer to him only as Chief Minister.

Although it is true that India's stand on Kashmir, its constitutional position and international commitments have in no way been affected or influenced by the accord, the State undoubetly has undergone a qualitative change: a semi-balance of peace, stability and normality has entered the political scene. Notwithstanding his controversial personality, erratic politics and short-sighted perspective, Sheikh Abdullah continues to be the most charismatic figure dominating Kashmir politics, holding the centre of the stage for the last 50 years as a symbol of Kashmiri nationalism.

To cap it all, his dismissal, arrest, imprisonment, externment, in fact every insult and injustice inflicted upon him has given him a martyr's halo, making him more and more popular. Consequently, he has emerged as the most outstanding example of Kashmiri aspirations. The efforts of his successors and the Centre to keep him out of politics and power proved so counter productive that to extern or imprison him at every subsequent election in the State, became an unavoidable necessity upto 1971. The Sheikh and the Plebiscite Front made their task easier by boycotting those elections. But when he decided to participate in 1971, the State government had to impose restrictions on his entry into the State and to meet this danger the Centre had to declare the Plebiscite Front an unlawful party.

These undemocratic and high handed methods gave rise to a self-seeking, pelf-seeking class which wielded unbridled authority to do whatever it liked in the name of loyalty to the Central government and the ruling party. To deal with Sheikh Abdullah and his incendiary politics, the Centre was compelled to support these 'loyalists'. Thus, we got into a vicious circle, with little hope of extricating ourselves.

Whatever the motives and considerations that weighed with Mrs. Gandhi and the Sheikh in forging the accord, its incontrovertible end product is the possibility of breaking this vicious circle, and being released from the anomalous and monopolitical strangle-hold of the Congress on the politics of the State. The March 1977 revolution has given to these possibilities a clear and concrete shape. As a result, for the first time after Independence, the Sheikh and his party, the National Conference, have come into power, after the conduct of what were comparatively free and impartial elections. In fact, it is such an extraordinary and revolutionary change that it would have been impossible even to think of it a year earlier. This pleasant but unexpected turn to the situation must have been a surprise for even Sheikh Abdullah and his colleagues.

In January 1977, before the declaration of general elections, the Sheikh held talks with Mrs Gandhi on the distribution of Assembly seats between the Congress and the National Conference on a basis of equality. The distribution of parliamentary seats had in fact been done on this very principle of fifty-fifty. Had Mrs. Gandhi won the elections, it was likely that he would have found it difficult to secure even 50% seats. But, whereas the March 1977 elections liberated the country from dynastic rule and bondage of fear, it also set free the Sheikh and his party from the shackles of political compromise and agreements.

The manner in which the Sheikh lent his unreserved and unqualified support to Mrs. Gandhi and the Emergency after having become the Chief Minister, pointedly highlights the fact that he had not accepted the realities of a changed situation resulting from a change in ideology or mental attitudes, but as the single entry-point to the place of power. For this very reason, the political accord proved the starting point of many of his compromises on principles and points of view and, right up to Mrs. Gandhi's debacle in March 1977, he continued making compromises with his avowed stands at every step. Such a climbdown, though hardly in harmony with his political stature and popular image, was an inevitable consequence of the Sheikh's political style and the background against which the accord was forged.

For Mrs. Gandhi, the accord had all the advantages. Without conceding anything she achieved all that her father failed to achieve in his life time. The process that had been set into motion with the withdrawal of the conspiracy case against the Sheikh in 1964 had been left half way through because of Nehru's death. Eleven years later his daughter led it to its logical conclusion. Jawaharlal was unhappy with Sheikh Abdullah's separatist political and pro-Pak stance. He wanted the Sheikh to accept the accession as final. The Indira-Abdullah accord represents the fulfillment of this wish. But, for Sheikh Abdullah, the agreement was no more than a charter of unfulfilled hopes and shattered dreams.

It was the outcome of his frustration and disillusionment. In spite of 22 years of imprisonment, exile and isolation from the position of power, he had seen no light emerging from anywhere. Meanwhile, a new generation had come to the fore. And this generation was free from the kind of emotional attachment which bound the elders to him. On the other hand, they held him responsible for those involved political entanglements, the complexities of which had shadowed their birth and growth. On the one hand, notwithstanding his stature and popularity, the fact of his being out of power coupled with the demands of practical politics had gradually rendered him irrelevant; on the other, the power blocks had lost interest in the Kashmir issue and the Security Council resolutions on Indo-Pak relations attracted the idle curiosity of research scholars only. Pakistan too had ceased to sustain life in a receding hope which petered out finally in 1965.

Dejected by Pakistan, the Sheikh eventually gave up the politics of non-cooperation and decided to participate in the elections in 1971. It is a pity that the State and Central governments prevented him from doing so, imposing restrictions on his re-entry into the State. This frustrated him further. The defeat of Pakistan in the Bangladesh war of 1971, shook him to the roots, delivering a crippling blow to his determination and resistance. Not only had Sheikh Abdullah refused to condemn the barbaric policies that Pakistan pursued during the early days of military intervention in Bangladesh, but in an interview published in a Hyderabad Urdu daily, he had justified the actions of General Yahya Khan and the notorious Tikka Khan.

The breakdown of the Pakistan war machine and the creation of Bangladesh now fully and finally convinced him that Pakistan could no longer keep the Kashmir issue alive. Thus, he turned to rebuild his broken bridges with Mrs. Gandhi. It must be said to the credit of Mrs. Gandhi that she seized the opportunity and encouraged the move. Had the present Prime Minister, Morarji Desai, been in her place, he would possibly have lost the opportunity by his stubborn attitude and rigid behaviour. In fact, after the creation of Bangladesh, when Sheikh Abdullah chose the path of reconciliation, giving up the posture of confrontation, Mrs. Gandhi got him installed as Chief Minister with the help of the Congress majority in the Legislature.

In spite of being a significant step towards normalising the political life of the state, fundamentally the accord was an agreement between two individuals and nothing more. It had no legal or constitutional validity. Between February 1975 and March 1977, it came to breaking point on many an occasion and the credit goes to the Sheikh that he saved it from getting snapped, albeit at the cost of his self-respect and personal pride. Precisely for this reason, the Congress Party withdrew its support to Sheikh Abdullah from the legislature and practically finished the accord after its defeat in March 1967. What followed has put a stop to the artifices and artificiaries of the politics of agreements, providing an opportunity to build the state politics on more firm, lasting and purposeful foundations.

The recent changes in the politics of the State must be welcomed from this point of view. The present government and its leadership has come into existence through free elections and public confidence, instead of political agreements and personal expediency. Thus, for the first time during the last 30 years, the democratic process has been allowed a free flow along its natural course.

There is no denying that to win the Assembly elections Sheikh Abdullah had fanned feelings of communalism, internal autonomy, parochialism and regionalism. He had created such an atmosphere that quite a few political observers, while conceding the elections to have been free, refuse to accept them as fair. But, to use a biblical image, would there be any politician in the land who could pelt the first stone at him?

It is worthy to note that to ensure his success at the polls the Sheikh, instead of banking upon his sacrifice, popularity and charisma had to take recourse to such trite and tried manoeuvres which are used by ordinary professional politicians. Some say that to influence the voters and evoke their sympathy, he even prolonged his illness. Whether this is true or false no one can tell. But there is no doubt that Sheikh Abdullah staked everything to win the last elections.

It goes to the credit of the Janata Government that it allowed the freest elections to the State, for the first time since independence, thus proving to the people of Kashmir that they too have the same fundamental democratic rights which the people in the rest of the country enjoy and exercise. In particularly, for the Muslims of the Valley, it was an incredible phenomenon that only two candidates of the ruling party at the Centre-the Janata Party--were returned out of the 42 seats it contested. In the past, some eighty to ninety percent candidates belonging to the ruling party used to win with 'large majorities'. From this point of view alone, the July 77 elections represent an important experiment in the politics of the State which are bound to yield good results.

While the results of the ’77 Assembly elections have demonstrated in full measure, Sheikh Abdullah's impressive strength they have also set limits and exposed the shortcomings of his success and influence. For instance, it is significant that the National Conference, in spite of its secular and noncommunal cast, has emerged only as a representative party of the Muslims in the State. That explains its slender image in Jammu where it received only seven out of a total of 32 seats and its all pervasive position in the Valley where it bagged all but three of the 42 seats.

It was the direct result of communal preaching and regional stance projected by the party during electioneering. In fact, if the Janata rebels had not contested the officially fielded candidates and thus divided the vote, the National Conference would hardly have managed a seat or two in Jammu.

Another significant factor to note is that in spite of the charismatic personality of Sheikh Abdullah and the calmly thought out slogans, calculated to heartwarm sectarian feelings, the National Conference was able to muster only 46% of the total votes polled, even though it secured 49 seats. In other words, the Sheikh won the election but lost the plebiscite. Let alone the fact that the Janata Party and its allies got a severe bashing at the hustings, it has brought stability to State politics and promoted the national cause in an extraordinary measure.

The recent political changes and developments in Jammu and Kashmir affirm that there are no shortcuts to political stability and national stability and national intergrity other than the democratic ones. The traumatic experience that the country passed through during the Emergency, and the current political situation in Pakistan, emphasised its importance even more clearly. Likewise, it is certain that the democratic system cannot be sustained, much less strengthened in the rest of the country if it is suppressed in a part of it, be it Nagaland or Kashmir.

Now that a normal political process has been set into motion in Kashmir, it should not be prevented from taking its logical and natural course by raising the sceptre of the threat to national solidarity, the country's interest and territorial integrity as in the past.

In view of his earlier secessionist postures, some quarters are some what apprehensive about Sheikh Abdullah's recent statements and utterances regarding the internal autonomy of the State. In my opinion, however, there is no need to read any far-reaching ambition in these public postures and statements. The fundamental fact is that he accepts Kashmir as an integral part of India, and regards Kashmir's accession as irrevocable and final.

It is well known that in spite of getting tremendous moral and material support from Pakistan during the last 22 years, the Sheikh has at no stage been in favour of Kashmir's accession to Pakistan. Having now acquired power through free elections, he could have little use for Pakistan. On the contrary, he has been talking of the return of State. His demand for his inclusion in any talks that India holds with Pakistan regarding Kashmir, betrays a psychological aberration rather than any political ambition. This is the nostalgia of the fifties, when big power interests in Kashmir and debates in the United Nations and other international forums kept him in the limelight, making him an international figure.

The most interesting aspect of Kashmir's current politics is the absence of any ideological base and economic programme in the State's most organised and influential organisation, the National Conference. True that it had a socio-economic programme called 'New Kashmir' before independence. But in the  present day context, the document is an historical anachronism. In the euphoria of the newly acquired power in 1975, no attempt at redefining political aims and economic goals was made, while the Plebiscite Front was rechristened the 'National Conference'. On the contrary, Sheikh Abdullah repeatedly emphasised that we should give a 'holiday' to politics for some time and get down to work.

After the imposition of Emergency, he was even more emphatic about this. But when all the equations of power and politics underwent a sea change, consequent upon the March 77 election, the National Conference leadership became keenly aware of the absence of political ideology and economic programme. To tackle this problem, Sheikh Abdullah tried to smoothen the way for an understanding with the new Central government and Janata leaders, so that under a new arrangement he continued to hold the reins of power. Fortunately for the State, the Janata leadership refused to have any such understanding and Kashmir was saved from yet one more spell of the 'politics of agreements'.

It was only when he had failed to strike this bargain that the Sheikh, raising the issue of internal autonomy and of safeguarding Article 370 during the Assembly elections, created an artificial atmosphere of confrontation between the Centre and the State, although the Foreign Minister, A.B. Vajpayee, while participating in the debate on Karan Singh's motion of adjournment against the imposition of Governor's rule in the State, had clearly stated that no change would be made in Article 370, without consulting the people of the state. Despite the fact that he too knew fully well that the Janata government had no such intentions, the Sheikh, in search of an election issue, 'invented' the spectre of danger to internal autonomy and Article 370, generating tremendous sympathy for him and support for his party.

The true nature of Sheikh Abdullah's interest and concern for the State's internal autonomy and safeguarding of Article 370 is, however, betrayed by his and his party's unconditional acceptance of the 42nd amendment during the Emergency. A committee appointed under the chairmanship of Afzal Beg, the Vice-President of the National Conference, described the amendment as 'consistent with the needs and demands of the time,' although it considerably eroded the country's federal structure and the State's internal autonomy. In terms of the amendment, if Parliament chose to abrogate Article 370 of the Constitution, the State government and Sheikh Abdullah could not have knocked at the Supreme Court gates, and Sheikh Abdullah and his party, instead of protesting against it, welcomed it.

The recent Sheikh-Jyoti Basu talks and statements regarding more and more autonomy to the States should be assessed against this background. With the Sheikh, autonomy is his total politics; with Basu an important weapon to carry forward his social aims, in conformity with his political ideology. It is only to emerge as the 'defender of the faith' and make up for the absence of a politico-economic programme, that the Sheikh wants to create a sense of insecurity among the people of the State. Personally I am in favour of granting a greater measure of internal autonomy to the States, particularly in the economic field; but the manner in which Sheikh Abdullah and his successors have used it throughout to suppress the democratic rights and civic freedoms of the people, leaves much room for doubt about its concept and content.

It would not be out of place to mention the Public Safety Ordinance promulgated by the Sheikh and his government in this connection. Sheikh Abdullah's demand for internal autonomy is qualitatively different to the demand of greater powers, by the other states. The Sheikh's demand has overtones of secessionism and communalism, because he links the issue of autonomy with accession. The State comprises three units, Jammu, Kashmir and Ladakh. The demand for internal autonomy represents, at best, the aspirations of the Kashmiri Muslims. On the contrary, the people of Jammu and Ladakh consider it as part of a plan of Kashmiri domination. Considered in this context, Sheikh Abdullah's leadership of this rightful demand of the other States is likely to prove a liability rather than an asset.

The Sheikh's advantage is that he has no political or intellectual commitment and that is why he can flit across freely and without invitation, from a Marxist Jyoti Basu, a fascist Indira Gandhi , to an orthodox Imam Syed Abdullah Bukhari. The greatest contribution of Sheikh Abdullah to the politics of the State is that he played a prominent role in secularising it. But it is an irony of history and a paradox of present times that he himself has been in the fore in creating communal and separatist feelings among the Muslims. The reason is that he has throughout made use of the religious idiom to preach secularism; so that whenever he has had to seek support of religious sentiment for personal advancement and aggrandizement, he had conveniently made religion a tool of politics, and politics a tool of religion.

At any rate, that is his political style and there is no escape from it. The tragedy is that Kashmir politics have stagnated under this style and stunted the growth of the Kashmiri people. Consequently, in this last quarter of the 20th Century, Kashmiris find themselves in the darkness of tribal ways of thought and reaction, prejudices and fears. The geographical conspiracy of nature of shut Kashmir up in a trap has been further strengthened by politicians by strengthening these barricades rather than breaking them down.

In this analysis, I have dwelt in detail on Sheikh Abdullah's personality and political attitudes. It was unavoidable. For, the Sheikh has been the fountain-head, centre and pivot of Kashmir politics for the last 50 years. Any objective analysis of Kashmir politics is bound to prove incomplete without an analysis of this subjective aspect of his personality. This undoubtedly sets the seal on Sheikh Abdullah as an extremely popular leader, wielding tremendous political influence; but it also points toward the mental and political backwardness of Kashmir, where persons matter more and issues and ideologies less. The fact is that politics in Kashmir has yet to be released from the strangle-hold of religiosity and ritual.

Consequently, the population, in terms of alignment and allegiance, is divided between different religious leaders, the Sheikh and Mirwaiz Farooq being the main contenders. The former uses the famous shrine of Hazratbal as his political platform and the latter the historical Jama Masjid of Srinagar as his political fortress. Taking their cue from them and encouraged by their successful manoeuvres both Shia and the Jamait-Islami leaders have joined the political game. Jamait-Islami, ironically, was encouraged by the ruling Congress Party in its efforts to enter the political arena with a view to steal Sheikh Abdullah's thunder. That explains why the party secured 5 seats in the State Assembly in the 1972 elections.

But is it is almost impossible to beat the Sheikh at his own game. The political influence of the Jamait vanished overnight when it clashed with him in the panchayat elections of 1974 and in the recent Assembly elections. The party has managed to get only one seat in the State Assembly. The Shia leaders are also busy organising their followers for political purposes and thus renewing the age-old Shia-Sunni conflict. The recent clashes between the two sects is symptomatic of the growing politicalization and exploitation of the two communities.

Among the other political parties the Janata Party, the two Congresses and Mirwaiz Farooq's Awami Action Committee deserve some mention. The Janata sapling is unlikely to strike roots in the Valley. Its constituents, Jana Sangh, BLD, Organisation Congress and Socialist Party, did not exist in the Valley; hence there was no ready-made cadre available to the Janata Party when it started functioning in the State in April 77. Sheikh Abdullah too delivered a stunning blow to it by calling it the 'Jana Sangh in a different garb'.

Finally, the utter defeat it suffered at the polls has completely disheartened those who rallied under its banner. The state of the party in the Valley can be judged from the fact that it cannot get a couple of rooms for its central office in the city of Srinagar. In other words, the party has no postal address.

As against this, in Jammu, it built up on the existent Jana Sangh base. Whereas the party has not even a central office in Srinagar, in Jammu it has several parallel offices. On account of the tug and pull between the Jana Sangh and non-Jana Sangh elements in Jammu, the party is in utter confusion which the Central leadership has yet to sort out. The increasing influence of the erstwhile Jana Sangh spells grave danger for the party's future as the minority community in the region would prefer joining the Congress or the National Conference rather than the Janata.

In the Valley, the existence of the Congress, right from the beginning has depended on the prestige of the Central government, the power and the vested interest that surround it. That explains its disintegration after its removal from the seat of power. The split at the top has staggered it further, and sizeable sections of Congress workers are switching over to the Janata and National Conference. In Jammu, the Congress though in a more stable position, has suffered considerably due to the split at the national level. The emerging position has exposed and exploded the myth of Karan Singh's popularity and influence in Jammu where the bulk of the Congress has gone with Indira Gandhi, whose faction appears stronger than the Reddy Congress. This may be partly due to the Sheikh's support and sympathy for Indira Gandhi.

Mirwaiz Farooq is essentially a religious leader but his political ambition is not unknown. During the Assembly elections in July 77, he threw his lot in with the Janata by supporting it. However, only one candidate fielded by his party, the Awami Action Committee, won. He and his party are considered to have Pak leanings. But changes in the Indo-Pak political scene have reduced his influence which is anyhow restricted to the few areas of Srinagar city alone. One of the healthier aspects of the process of normalisation of State politics since July 1977, is the complete eclipse of the secessionist elements in the Valley. Mirwaiz Farooq's support to the Janata Party (and he continues to be friendly) was a significant factor in this direction. Whatever may have been his reasons for supporting the Janata Party against Sheikh's National Conference, it clearly indicates the qualitative change in the extremist politics of Kashmir and Kashmiri leaders.

Source: SEMINAR, April, 1978

*The author, a former MP edited ‘AINA’ and was a talented journalist in Urdu. Recently an anthology of his writings in AINA, has been brought in two volumes.

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