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LARGEST
CIRCULATED ENGLISH MONTHLY OF J&K
A News Magazine of Kashmiri Pandit Community |
| | Home | November 2002 Issue | |
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By Manoj Joshi The installation of a PDP-Congress government may have changed the political ambience of the Valley, but the threat of terrorism and insurgency is alive and kicking. Thousands of armed men belonging to a dozen organisations remain in the Valley. Some are dormant, waiting to see which way the wind is blowing. Others, like the Lashkar-e-Toiba, Jaish-e-Mohammed and Al-Badr, are ready to act at the bidding of their masters in Pakistan. How can they be neutralised? First, offer Kashmiri militants an amnesty with a realistic rehabilitation package. This could encourage those who are dormant to surrender. Second, negotiate with Pakistan to end cross-border infiltration. This is not as farfetched as it seems since Gen. Musharraf actually committed himself to the idea in June and the result was a perceptible drop in militancy for a month or so thereafter. Third, step up the anti-terrorist campaign in the urban areas to eliminate terrorists sheltering there. This requires good intelligence and a reconstructed Special Operations Group. The SOG, a special arm of the J&K police, has played an important role in curbing urban militancy, but their undisciplined conduct and occasional atrocities made them counter-productive. Fourth, provide market rate compensation for people whose houses are destroyed in anti-terrorist confrontations. When the police learn of militants hiding in a house, they surround it. The confrontation usually ends with the house being destroyed, killing the militants holed up inside. The owner, who in all likelihood was coerced into sheltering the militants, merely gets Rs 1-2 lakhs as compensation. So most people facing the predicament prefer to let the militants hide there hoping they will leave soon. Informing the police is seen as the worst option since it ends up in the loss of home and hearth. Fifth, step up operations against hardcore Pakistan jihadis sheltering in the high mountains. Typical Army troops such as the Rashtriya Rifles are not sufficiently trained or motivated to tackle these tenacious adversaries some of whom are fidayeen forces. Special forces units conduct daring and difficult operations against these militants with considerable success because they are trained and have the professional confidence to operate in small groups deep in the mountains. India needs to raise two divisions of SF units if it is to sanitise the heights from which the Pakistanis have been operating for the past five years. Sixth, raise the training standards and equipment of the police and para-military forces operating in the Valley. Better trained forces are more disciplined and less prone to committing excesses. Equipment levels are abysmal with the BSF, for example, having to make do with 20 kg bullet-proof plates instead of lighter jackets.
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