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LARGEST
CIRCULATED ENGLISH MONTHLY OF J&K
A News Magazine of Kashmiri Pandit Community |
| | Home | November 2002 Issue | |
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By David Devadas A minor sweepstake was organised at the beginning of this month at one of Srinagar's leading hotels, where several of the journalists covering Kashmir's elections stayed. Putting Rs 50 into the kitty, each participant predicted the number of seats the National Conference would win. As it turned out, all the journalists grossly overestimated the then ruling party's performance. One of the brightest stars of Indian television predicted 39 seats. The hotel staff, on the other hand, was much closer to the mark. One predicted 23, another 27. The man who got it right, at 28, is a restaurant steward. Few city residents voted and not many of the hotel staff could have visited their villages during they campaign. It was, after all, the busiest time for the hotel in a long, long time. Yet they knew the mood of their people. Journalists, not only those visiting from New Delhi, even many Kashmiri journalists, were out of touch. In conversations with several of them over the previous month, I found just one, relatively junior reporter, who had a finger on the collective pulse of his people. Most of the others had an inkling that the National Conference was not riding high but were sure it would get enough seats to coble a majority with the support of independents and small groups. It is not entirely coincidental that this was also the prediction of intelligence agencies such as the Intelligence Bureau. Srinagar-based reporters have by and large got used to reporting violence as a daily routine, and nothing else. To do this effectively, they have built links with police and security force officers, and intelligence men too. I discovered over the past few weeks that some established Kashmiri journalists do not have even a nodding acquaintance with mainstream politicians, even erstwhile ministers. These elections showed the inadequqcies of an exclusive focus on violence. Some voters asserted that they had separated the "Kashmir issue" from their everyday problems. This electoral process was meant to elect representatives who would get them a road here, a bridge there, drainage, potable water, canal irrigation, electricity. There is a good reason why rural Kashmiris went to vote in such large numbers - apart from the universal inertia of urban voters and the fact that urban voters have many methods for the redressal of grievances other than knocking at a legislator's door. The fact is that rural Kashmiris in many parts of the Valley experienced virtual rule by the orthodox Jamaat-e-Islami during the couple of years in the early 1990s when the Hizbul Mujahideen dominated that hinterland. It is the same rural Kashmir that behaved so differently from Srinagar in its response to the boycott call. Without hesitation, rural Kashmir seized the opportunity provided by these elections to force a change of guard. Even if a different government did not bring relief from terror, it might at least build bridges, roads and gutters without skimming funds. Indeed, people spoke of putting an end to corruption and of aspirations for jobs and other economic prospects. "And we can always vote out the new lot next time if they don't perform," said many a vibrant Kashmiri.
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