Kashmir Sentinel: April 1st--May 31st, 2001

Has NDA-led coalition at Centre finally accepted US mediation on Kashmir? Why are Kashmiri separatists repeatedly emphasising that "all hopes for the solution of the Kashmir issue will be doomed if the Vajpayee government is destabilized." Are the current initiatives on Kashmir the consequence of the road map chalked out by the Americans? To come directly to the issue-who is Mansoor Ijaz and what is his "Mission Kashmir".

Mansoor Ijaz, a Pakistani American, is a nuclear physicist and a New York-based investment banker. His father played a crucial role in assembling the intellectual infrastructure of Pakistan's nuclear programme. Ijaz nurses political ambitions too. He moves round in Democratic Party Circles and has contributed to the campaign funds of party candidates, including Hillary Clinton. He sees himself moving towards Congressional politics within the next five or six years. His present official position is that of a member of the influential US Think Tank Council on Foreign Relations.

Mansoor Ijaz made five visits to India and Pakistan during past one year to arbitrate Kashmir 'dispute'. Govt. of India accords him a status that befits only high-profile emissaries of the Head of a State. At least on two occasions, he visited Delhi on special 'out of passport' visas, and full secrecy was maintained about his identity and itinerary. Ijaz kept Clinton's national security team briefed at each stage of the process.

All the time he maintained, presumably keeping in view Indian public's sensitivity on third party mediation on Kashmir, that he was not acting on behalf of the Clinton administration. Mansoor Ijaz claims he has been drawn to the Kashmir problem because" 'oppressed' people have no capacity to speak for themselves and stop violations that occur against them in the name of religion or politics or money". As for official support, Ijaz adds, "the initiative (ceasefire) had backing from President Bill Clinton as an effective means for preventing the internal implosion of Pakistan at the hands of its Islamic Zealots".

Three days before Ramadan ceasefire a symposium--"Next Steps in J&K: Give Peace a Chance", was organised with blessings from PMO, at Gurgaon. Ijaz delivered the Keynote address at the seminar. The symposium was jointly organised by a Delhi-based organisation, Peace Initiatives, Institute of Regional Studies, Pakistan and Lord Avebury, a Liberal member of the House of Lords in Britain.

To gauge the reaction of people of the sub-continent to his "initiative", Ijaz has been regularly interacting with media in US, Gulf States, India and Pakistan. The New-York based investment banker says he began his "Mission Kashmir", sometime back in September 1999. Around the same time news was making rounds that a senior member of Vajpayee's Cabinet had opened communication channels with leaders of Hurriyat and some militants groups through an influential Kashmiri political leader. A few months later, two separatist leaders, Abdul Ghani Lone and Sardar Abdul Qayum Khan were to claim that solution to Kashmir crisis was round the corner.

July Ceasefire
The July ceasefire, brokered by Ijaz failed to hold on. He has come out with full details in an article, published in International Herald Tribune (November 22). In the article titled, 'The August Initiative', he says that he had during his visit to the subcontinent proposed a framework for dialogue to the two Prime Ministers, that "envisioned empowering ordinary Kashmiris, 'civilian and militant' alike, as the Central partners for peace". To Musharraf, he counselled that "Pakistan was in danger of losing the moral authority it once held in Kashmir by allowing, indeed encouraging, increasingly indiscriminate violent behaviour by Islamic radicals fighting there". Ijaz implored him to "persuade the Mujahideen under his control to opt for non-violent means to put the onus for peace back in New Delhi's court" and told Musharraf that Kashmiris were fatigued over continued violence. Ijaz claims that before this he had got a commitment from GoI on unconditional and immediate cessation of hostilities and negotiating permanent Kashmir solution. July ceasefire, as per him had 'backing' from both Gen. Musharraf as well as Syed Salahuddin. Musharraf developed cold feet when the ceasefire was "portrayed in fundamentalist circles as a "sell-out". Ijaz had carried a letter from Salahuddin addressed to President Clinton. The Hizb chief had sought verification of the President's direct backing of Ijaz's peace initiative. Jehadi groups then threatened to replace Syed Salahuddin as head of United Jehad Council, an umbrella organisation of terrorist groups based in Pakistan.

Ijaz gives three reasons for collapse of July ceasefire. Musharraf failed to publicly embrace the cease-fire that he had privately initiated with Syed Salahuddin. Secondly, Salahuddin had not been able to develop consensus among Mujahideen groups when faced by threats from Pakistan's Islamic fundamentalists. Thirdly, he blames Vajpayee for "succumbing" to hawks on the issue of 'Constitution' and 'disputed' territory. The Indian Prime Minister had drawn widespread criticism from nationalist quarters over his remarks on holding discussions with Hurriyat "within the framework of Insaniyat".

Ijaz, however, presents an apologetic defence for Musharaff's duplicity. He says, "on one side, he has failed economy and massive decay of political institutions, on another he has global economic and military sanctions that have forced him to rely on nuclear weapons as the primary deterrent, on the third he has enmity from India and on the fourth he has pressure from Afghanistan and Iran. He has the Kashmir problem on top of him and his Islamic fundamentalists closing in. It is easy to understand why he could not easily embrace a ceasefire on what is easily Pakistan's most sensitive foreign policy problem."

'The August Initiative'
Despite the failure of July ceasefire, separatist leaders like Majid Dar and Fazl Haq Qureshi continued to claim that ceasefire process has been only delayed but not derailed. They said that renewed ceasefire would be in place within three months. The Defence Minister, Mr Fernandes went on record saying that GoI was in regular contact with Hizb.

In August Ijaz and US diplomats proposed a formula in which "Pakistan would be brought to the negotiating table at the outset of political discussions after the ceasefire had taken hold, first bilaterally and then, at the Kashmiris' request trilaterally. India's adamancy not to talk to Pakistan unless cross-border terrorism stopped, would disappeare in the Valley-wide ceasefire call from Salahuddin. He would receive critical support from Gen. Musharraf to bring unruly Islamists on board, and Gen. Musharraf in turn would get a nod from Washington along with much-needed IMF aid."

Ijaz has thrown more light on the concessions which he sought from India. As the dialogue process proceeded, "India would agree to a significant, verification and permanent reduction of its forces in the Valley in exchange for a verifiable withdrawal of Pakistani militants. In the process, the Mujahideen voice would be strengthened and unified and Pakistan could take credit for having tangibly supported through its military advocacy of the Kashmiri Cause." This reference to strengthening "the Mujahideen voice" seems to suggest that India would have to make significant concessions to attain that objective. In this context, influential Pakistanis and members of the US establishment have been peddling variants of Dixon Plan, with Kashmir valley attaining some form of quasi-independence.

Repeated use of the term 'Kashmiris' by Ijaz and Americans is meant to emphasise that Kashmiri Sunnis are the final arbites.

The above framework, Ijaz claims "was agreed to by the Indians and conditioned on Pakistan intelligence accepting it, by Salahuddin in late August." Commenting upon this, Ejaz Hyder, the Pakistani Journalist wrote in the Friday Times, "that Salahuddin should seek guarantees from Pakistani intelligence rather than Islamabad sounds intriguing.. While the political leaders may opt for dialogue, the militants could always be made to scuttle any such effort."

A revived ceasefire, was to have been followed by Vajpayee-Musharraf meeting on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly session in New York last September. Though the GoI was not averse to an impromptu summit meeting, it baulked at the venue fearing that this might legitimise the idea that the US or the UN had a role to play.

There was no public contradiction by GOI to the above claims made by Mansoor Ijaz. Political circles were intrigued when GoI went out of way to recommend release of IMF aid to Pakistan. However, on the question of reducing troops strength, Mr Fernandes reacted only when a section of the electronic media made repeated broadcasts that India would pull out its troops during the next five years. Mr Fernandes said the reports were untrue. Ijaz says the agreement worked out could not be implemented because of Pakistan's "bleed India" policy. An effort was made by Bruce Reidel, the State Department's pointman on South Asia, to exert pressure on Pakistan.

Musharraf's Belligerence
Gen. Musharraf instead became more belligerent. In an interview with BBC on Oct 16, he threatened, "we'll nuke India if our security is in jeopardy", and added that he was "fed up" with India. It was around this time in a diplomatic embarrassment for India, Saudi Arabia came with an announcement asking Mr Jaswant Singh, the Minister of External Affairs to defer his visit to Saudi Arabia. That Mr Jaswant Singh's visit to Saudi Arabia was linked to Kashmir was confirmed by Mansoor Ijaz himself. In an interview to the News, (December 24) Islamabad, he claimed, "the Saudi government is taking an active role in finding a mechanism to moderate the Jehad movement in Kashmir. He added, "It is no accident that (External Affairs Minister) Jaswant Singh will visit Riyadh in early January just a week after militant leaders return from Jeddah and a week before Hurriyat leaders are scheduled to meet Hizbul Mujahideen Supremo, Syed Salahuddin and company in Islamabad." The decision of GoI to allow the visit of two Hurriyat representatives, Mirwaiz Omar Farooq and Maulana Abbas Ansari to OIC meet at Doha on November 11 was unexceptionable. In which capacity there were allowed to participate in OIC meet?

Cease-fire II

November saw many interesting developments happening. GoI opened a line with Hizbul Chief Salahuddin through Shahi Imam of Jama Masjid, Delhi. Mr Salman Haider, former Foreign Secretary, GoI and Mr Mohd Yousuf Tarigami, involved in Track-II parleys demanded announcement of unilateral ceasefire by India. In fact, Mr Tarigami's party, CPM had to denounce this statement in view of embarrassment it caused. Mr Haider also demanded resumption of dialogue with Pakistan and opposed India's alleged support to Northern Alliance in Afghanistan. He questioned the nationalist consensus by saying, "I wonder what interests India is trying to locate in Afghanistan by helping Ahmad Shah Masood or belittling Talibans". Mr Tarigami, the CPM leader from Kashmir valley, called for partial withdrawal of Indian troops. A train carrying 15,000 tons of Indian suggar rolled into the eastern Pakistani city of Lahore commenting on this, Muddassir Rizvi wrote in The Dawn, the Pakistani daily, "many observers saw the sugar deal as a move to break the ice-not that trade will bring lasting peace, but that the two countries will make peace so they can trade". On November 23, Mr Abdul Sattar, Pakistan's Foreign Minister told The Times of India that it has a duty to stop militants from crossing the LoC in Kashmir. He went on to say, "A state is not responsible for the views and actions of every one of its citizens. The State is responsible for actions by the organs of the State. Of course, individuals who engage in crimes should be tried". The European Union Asstt. Secretary for South Asia and Oceania, Mr Dominique Girard told reporters in Islamabad on November 22 that EU had conveyed its concern to India and Pakistan over the "tense and dangerous stalemate and there is need for some action to unblock the situation." Girard added that EU did not want Pakistan to be isolated. "We value dialogue with Pakistan. Even, we don't want to isolate Taliban to have dialogue with them," he stressed.

On November 26, PTI quoted Saifuddin Soz as saying, "Even if we don't have tripartite talks there could be triangular talks that is simultaneous talks between Delhi and Islamabad on the one hand and Delhi and Kashmiri leaders on the other". In a seminar "Exploring Reconciliation," organised by the Centre for Dialogue and Reconciliation, in which former Finance Minister of Pakistan, Mubashir Hassan and BJP chief Bangaru Laxman were star speakers, Mr Laxman hinted on the possibility of a loose Indo-Pak-Bangladesh confederation, focused in particular on economic issues. Mr. Hassan held the doctrine of Nation-State responsible for the trouble in the sub-continent.

Both in India as well as abroad, some of the statements made by Indian military commanders on Kashmir were received as unusual. Gen VP Malik the COAS on the eve of his retirement said, "ultimately there has to be a political solution to the problem." He added that political initiatives were necessary "to counter the alienation of the local population". Gen. Padmanabhan, his successor stated, emphatically that "in the history of mankind no insurgency has been solved by any army" and called for a political solution to the Kashmir problem. The retiring GoC. Northern Command, Lt. Gen. HM Khanna, said on January 15 that Army has done its job and, "the political leaders should now start the process towards a political solution during the ceasefire"

What is the political solution they are talking about? The uncalled for statements were interpreted differently in Delhi, Islamabad and Washington. Gen. Padmanabhan openly defended the cease-fire decision, despite different perceptions by field level commanders. The General said, "the Army is never vulnerable because of a decision we ourselves have taken. We are also a party to the (ceasefire) decision. We are quite happy with the decision". On the eve of second extension of ceasefire on January 14, when neither J&K Govt. nor the Home Ministry were willing to speak in favour of ceasefire, Gen. Padmnabhan supported ceasefire extension and dismissed escalation in attacks as sporadic actions and desperate attempts by terrorists to retain credibility. He said these were staged by groups that lacked popular support.

Vajpayee's Announcement
On November 28, Vajpayee government came with two announcements of significant import. One, it declared unilateral cessation of CI operations against all terrorists, inspite of the fact that not even Hizb accepted the ceasefire. Secondly, GoI agreed to allow Hurriyat delegation to visit Pakistan to hold talks there, knowing well that Hurriyat had not capacity to rein in militant groups.

On November 30, Mansoor Ijaz told Gulf News in Dubai that there was every possibility of a summit between Mr Vajpayee and Gen. Musharraf after Ramadan in New Delhi if the Indian Government's unilateral ceasefire in J&K holds and the Pak military responds positively to it. He added that in that case, the Indo-Pakistani bilateral negotiations could--run simultaneously with Indo-Kashmir talks. Ijaz sought to "reconcile" conditionalities put by India and Pakistan. He said that "in making peace, it is essential to find face-saving mechanisms for all parties to come to the table ready for the tough task of making concessions aimed at a permanent solution". Ijaz claimed, "If General Musharraf supports a Valley-wide ceasefire, which is glaringly easy to do since the winter snows are coming soon, cross-border conditionalities disappear in Delhi". He, however, hastened to add that the key to Pakistani involvement in the Kashmir issue on a tripartite basis was the Kashmiri himself. "If Salahuddin, who heads the militant group Hizbul Mujahideen and Yasin Malik of JKLF want Pakistan at the table, India will agree," he added. On Pakistan's repeated assertion of tripartite talks on Kashmir, Ijaz said it demonstrated a complete lack of understanding by Islamabad of its own stated position".

Indian Position
Mansoor claimed that GoI was fully supporting his efforts for permanent solution to Kashmir problem. He said the grave risk that Mr Vajpayee ran now was how long the Indian public could withstand the humiliation of attacks on its Army during the ceasefire. He added in his recent conversation with strategic planners in New Delhi, he sensed "a fundamental commitment to find peace, no matter the cost". Ijaz said he believed, "If India is prepared to bleed through what many now believe is a pointless guerrilla war, they may be equally willing to bleed the same amount for peace--a strategy that will clearly pay greater dividends".

Pak Response
Pakistan reciprocated with a gesture to observe "maximum restraint in border to strengthen and stabilise the ceasefire". It followed a three-week lull on LoC. The Pakistani response came three days after a financially bankrupt Pakistan received the first disbursement of an IMF loan. Of a total of $538 million sanctioned by the IMF, $200 million was released in the last week of November. Pakistan had also to address the problem of rescheduling the debt by the end of 2000. By linking restraint on LoC to IMF loan, Pakistan was making a virtue out of necessity.

Ijaz Praises Musharraf
Reacting to this in a commentary titled "Peace Momentum in Kashmir", in Los Angeles Times (December 9), Ijaz lavished praises on General Musharraf. He noted, "this decision could pay the way for a longer term ceasefire in Kashmir valley, lay ground for a trilateral summit between India, Pakistan and militant leaders in next month." He praised General Musharraf for spending "considerable time in bringing hawks (in Military Intelligence) on board the peace train or moving them off the tracks". Ijaz claimed that he has received assurance from the Indian leadership that Islamabad could eventually be involved in a dialogue to resolve the Kashmir dispute, if the militant leaders insisted on it. He also hinted that 596 million dollar aid from IMF to Pakistan was okayed after seeking commitment from General Musharraf to commit Pakistan to peace process".

Referring to the implications of Pakistan's restraint at LoC, Ijaz noted, "Islamabad's response demonstrates the fusing of whatever fractures may have existed within the establishment over the question of how to respond to the Indian cease-fire offer. It seems that General Musharraf had controlled his hawks by either moving them out of the way or persuading them that limited compromise on terms for talks with Delhi is in Pakistan's greater interest".

Ijaz, however, hastened to add that Pakistan had very little time left to respond and General Musharraf had no control over the national security affairs or over the militant groups. He told the Friday Times (December 1) that the situation in Pakistan was deteriorating and Pakistan faces the threat of becoming "dysfunctional". He maintained, "Pakistan was on the edge of a precipice facing economic bankruptcy and political disintegration simultaneously. It has a military within which the hawks and doves are fiercely competing to set the national agenda, often at conflict with one another's objectives. The question to be asked is at what point do those who are entrusted with ensuring the life and longevity of the country find 'Jihad' a counterproductive strategy to ensuring national security".

American pressures
On December 4, State Spokesman, Richard Boucher called for resumption of Indo-Pak dialogue. Describing Pakistani offer of maximum restrain as a "positive development", he said, "we have strongly favoured a resumption of dialogue between India and Pakistan and our belief that India, Pakistan and all residents of Kashmir region have to be part of the solution". A few days later Michael Krepon, Head of Henry Stimson Centre, a US Think Tank involved on Kashmir, visited Srinagar as emissary of President Clinton. He had detailed parleys with Fazl Haq Qureshi and Musadiq Adil, the separatist leaders aligned to Majid Dar's faction. In Jammu, Dr Abdullah went on record saying that there was US conspiracy to divide J&K and that final settlement would be around LoC. US establishment continued to maintain pressure on India and Pakistan. General Henry H. Shelton, Chairman of US Joint Chiefs of Staff, in an address to the National Press stated that South Asia's future may be decided on the 'high frontiers' of long-pending Kashmir dispute between India and Pakistan. On December 13, US threatened to brand Lashkar-e-Toiba as a terrorist outfit.

Ijaz Opens Cards
Subsequently what Mansoor Ijaz told Pakistan media is significant. He said India's offer to start the long march was genuine and it was dead sincere about peace in South Asia. He added Pakistan was destroying its economy and the fabric of society by pursuing the "misguided concept of holy wars".

Ijaz said he disagreed that J&K was India's internal matter. He alleged that Delhi has always sought to marginalize Pakistan, but the Indian policy makers realise that there is no way to circumvent Islamabad. He said that India has to give "deep concessions" to find a comprehensive solution to the Kashmir problem. Mansoor Ijaz demanded that Hurriyat leaders be allowed to visit Pakistan and said, "this will have the effect of isolating mercenaries". He claimed that even Salahuddin had contempt for "overly violent behaviour of paid mercenaries", in his midst. Contrary to Ijaz's claim, Salahuddin has been using more extremist language against India. He recently threatened to extend the subversive war beyond the Himalayan borders.

Nationalist Offensive
By the end of February, the dangerous implications of "Peace Diplomacy" pursued by GoI were clear. There was total deterioration of ground-level situation in J&K and terrorist groups were hitting targets outside J&K as well. Number of Fidayeen attacks by Jehadi groups increased appreciably. Far from isolating the hardline faction in Hurriyat, Syed Ali Shah Geelani emerged as the rallying point for all the terrorist groups and the separatist sentiment in Kashmir valley. Pakistan also failed to reciprocate beyond limited initial gestures. America while expressing its inability to rein in Pakistan over its brazen support to cross-border terrorism, continued to put pressure on India to resume dialogue with Pakistan. It also maintained its diplomatic support to Kashmiri separatist leaders.

The External Affairs Ministry, Home Ministry and Security Forces establishment now openly questioned the wisdom of pursuing the dangerous peace diplomacy, being pursued by PMO.

Mr LK Advani, the Union Home Minister said passports would be issued to only those APHC leaders whom Union government considered appropriate. The External Affairs Minister, Mr Jaswant Singh supported Mr Advani and said APHC leaders' visit would amount to according legitimacy to Hurriyat as representative of people of state. He added it would also mean that the trilateral negotiations were acceptable to India-which would imply reversal of a long-standing policy on Kashmir. Mr Jaswant Singh also went on record voicing serious opposition to tripartite talks, and autonomy. He said accession of Kashmir to India was irrevocable. On autonomy to J&K, he added it could open pandora's box for a country with rich religious and ethnic diversity.

The assessments of Intelligence Bureau, Home Ministry, J&K government and security forces', as reported in the media, ran counter to the claims made by supporters of ceasefire in PMO. They argued that terrorists were using it to consolidate their position. Even Brijesh Mishra, otherwise an advocate of extending ceasefire in the meeting of cabinet committee on security (January 22), expressed alarm at turn of events. Home Minister Advani said there was not much change in Kashmir valley except cessation of indiscriminate firing along LoC. He added that Pakistan was not exercising required level of control over military who continued to target security forces and sensitive installations and infiltration in Jammu had also shown an upward trend. Advani told reporters that there was a view in the government that security forces be allowed to resume counter-insurgency operations.

Pot Calling the Kettle Black
Having successfully derailed the initiatives of security forces in J&K, allowing Jehadi groups to consolidate for new offensive in summer, Mansoor now sought to put the blame for failure of his 'Kashmir initiative' on India itself. Sensing that larger sections of Indian establishment were seeing through his dangerous diplomacy, he managed to find ed-page space in the Times of India. He wrote, "Formulas for moving forward have been constructed and largely agreed upon. But dangerous signs have appeared in the latest extension move which could reduce a well-intentioned peace effort to rubble because of unnecessary obfuscation in New Delhi."

Ijaz now demanded that India must 'Involve the Islamist's (Jamaat Islami in Pakistan) in peace process and allow Syed Ali Shah Geelani to visit Pakistan as part of Hurriyat delegation. "Unlocking Jamaat's door and getting its hard-liners to the peace table was better than getting Mr Vajpayee and General Musharraf in the same room together," he suggested to GoI. Ijaz claims he nearly worked out an acceptable formula between Jamaat hard-liners in Pakistan and a senior Indian government official, which incorporated political and religious sensitivities of Jehadists. These related to characterizing the "dispute" in Kashmir and addressing the triangulation problem. If Ijaz is to be believed, "New Delhi failed to respond to the crack in the door Jamaat opened that day".

Blackmail
Ijaz resorts to his last weapon--blackmail and says if India fails to implement the formula "worked out", Jamaat could use the ceasefire's various complications to simply strengthen its grip on power in the Valley and set up the conditions for much more entrenched resistance this summer". He adds that militant operations would then have a unified political and military command under the remote-controlled guidance of Qazi Hussain Ahmed, and General Musharraf would also take a harder line inside Pakistan.

The Prospect
GoI does not the need the advice of Salman Haiders and Mir Qasims to decide whether it should allow Hurriyat leaders to visit Pakistan or not. Possibly, Sheikh Abdul Aziz, the Hurriyat leader now touring Pakistan has already answered that question. It needs to muster courage to tell Mansoor Ijaz and his American patrons that Ijaz's "Mission Kashmir", strikes at the very roots of Indian sovereignty over Kashmir.