Vision Kashmir

Towards an Autonomy of the Mind

By Manoj Joshi

Elections are not a panacea to cure the ills of the body politic. But they are excellent scanning tools, and that is why the polls in Jammu and Kashmir have offered us a better diagnosis of the situation.

The first picture revealed that there remained a substantial block of people, who stayed out of the electoral process by choice. They may be less than one-fifth of the people of the Kashmir region or one-tenth of the entire state, but they are a crucial segment - the urban intelligentsia. They are looking for a political settlement that will take into account their somewhat ill-defined goal best summed up by the word 'azadi' or 'self-determination'. They did not believe that the elections were irrelevant, but neither did they anticipate the "free and fair" nature of the polls.

Second, the bulk of the people of the state were looking for tangibles like "better governance" rather than things like "autonomy" or "azadi". In the Valley, they were mainly rural folk who tend to be more pragmatic. They have been quick to realise that they were the ones who were paying the heaviest price for the armed struggle which, in any case, appears unable in the near or long-term future to bring an end to Indian sovereignty in Kashmir.

Third, the pattern of the electoral turnout confirmed what was known for years - the separatist sentiment was a strictly Kashmiri-speaking Sunni Muslim phenomenon, much stronger in cities than the countryside. In other words, the Shias of Kargil and even of the Valley were not particularly affected by the azadi sentiment, leave alone that of jehad. Neither are the Gujjars and Bakarwals who reside in the mountainous regions of the Valley proximate to the Line of Control.

Fourth, 11 years of fundamentalist propaganda and bloodletting has not altered the basic character of the people of the state. Instead of making them more insular, it has opened them to wider influences. Foreign interest on the issue of Kashmir has played a role, but the greater impact has been that of cable TV which has brought to the Kashmiri all the complexities of Indian democracy as well as its strengths. Conversely, it has also brought home the brittle nature of the Pakistani polity.

Fifth, that Pakistan is not a major factor in the Valley, despite the 2,000-odd militants it has in the state. They retain the ability to murder at will, but do not possess a political message that has any resonance in the Valley.

Sixth, that the ethnically diverse Jammu region with a substantial Hindu population has come into its own. Some may say that this was because the Valley votes were split between the PDP and the NC. Actually, the years of strife in the Valley have brought a dividend of sorts for the more peaceful Jammu region and helped shape a sub-regional identity.

The composite image of these 'scans' points to the unique opportunity that the Union government has to provide a lasting cure to the disease that has afflicted Kashmir.

To begin at the toughest point: Negotiations with Pakistan. Given its obsessive attitude towards Kashmir, this is a difficult area which must be managed. Having tried and failed through armed suasion in the past 10 months, New Delhi has no option but patient diplomacy. India has to build on the credibility of the election process and get the international community to keep pushing Islamabad to withdraw its support to the jehadis.

The elections have provided a true measure of the Hurriyat elements and revealed them to be smaller than they appeared. But it would be self-defeating to pretend that they do not exist. With its present strength, New Delhi should not hesitate to engage them, to the extent they are willing, to conduct a rational and realistic dialogue.

Many in India and abroad have said that dialogue with separatists and the Pakistanis must resume. But few have detailed what it could involve. It has been commonly assumed that the key issue is greater autonomy but there is little clarity beyond this. Should this be the kind of autonomy that was promised by the Delhi Agreement in 1953, or the kind the Chinese provide to the autonomous region of Tibet? What does autonomy mean in a largely federal India?

The Election Commission's performance has revealed new angularities to the subject. Some Union or Central institutions can actually be a safeguard for Kashmir's autonomy. What would have been the outcome if the state had its own election commission?

Any negotiations will come up against the uncomfortable fact that there are few freedoms that Kashmiris lack even now. They can live where they want, speak their minds, trade, practise their religion and so on. They are ruled by Kashmiri politicians and policed by Kashmiri policemen. Only an insurgency in the Valley aided hugely by Pakistan compels the presence of a largely non-Kashmiri military and paramilitary. So it is not the substance of some additional autonomy that the Kashmiris need, but something else not easily definable, the addressing of a sentiment. Finessing this is in some ways a task more difficult than dealing with Pakistan.

(Courtesy: The Times of India)

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