Old habits die hard

In Assam, the AGP’s close ties with the ULFA created many problems once it came to power. Will there be similar problems faced by the PDP which has been rubbing shoulders with militants?

By Avirook Sen

During the Asom Gana Parishad’s first stint in power in Assam (1985-1990), there was a great scandal-apart from the AGP’s coming to power in the first place. It was referred to as the ‘Statefed scandal’. A group of contractors managed to get Rs 2 crore worth of contracts to supply foodgrain to the state’s network of ration shops. They supplied rotten grain and soon, the AGP was stinking along with the godowns.

The government did what governments do: it set up a commission to find out where the money had gone. The commission was headed by Ashok Saikia, the then education commissioner. But as Saikia went about his business, he encountered innumerable roadblocks. Somewhat in frustration, he complained about this at a state cabinet meeting. What happened next is pretty illuminating: Chief Minister Prafulla Mahanta reportedly told the bureaucrat that the money was for the “boys”. In other words, for the cadres and leaders of the extremist United Liberation Front of Asom (ULFA).

So what’s this got to do with Kashmir? A lot, actually.

Mufti Mohammad Sayeed and his People’s Democratic Party (PDP) have come to power with the help of the Congress in Jammu and Kashmir. On the face of it, this is a fine thing. People in the state have thrown a dynasty out, and they have done so freely and fairly. But somehow, one feels a sense of deju vu.

The AGP came to power in Assam twice (1985-90 and 1996-2001) with the help of a crucial non-political ally, the ULFA. From all accounts, the PDP has a few non-political allies as well. How strong the alliances are is a matter of conjecture. But one suspects that they are probably a little stronger than the Congress-PDP alliance.

The reasons for saying this are out in the open. Kashmiri militants vowed not to let the elections be conducted peacefully. They killed some candidates and tried to kill others. They targeted political workers and tried to disrupt campaign through a variety of intimidatory methods.

Now, can you think of one attack on a PDP candidate? One disruption of a PDP rally?

In the 1996 assembly elections in Assam, several AGP candidates fighting from ULFA strongholds signed-or were made to sign-plain paper agreements saying things like they support Assam’s right to self-determination and so on. A front organization of the ULFA was getting the signatures. In return, the candidate got votes from ULFA ‘constituencies’. Two AGP ministers were actually exposed for having done this. There were plenty more.

Cut to the PDP campaign of 2002. The party decides to hold a rally in Anantnag district. This is apparently okay with the militants, except for one thing: they need to wrap up the rally by 4:30 PM. Why? Because the militants plan to attack a posse of security personnel shortly after that. The rally ends on time. But here’s the chilling part: the ambush is laid as planned. But by a stroke of luck, the forces don’t turn up.

And now, Mufti Sayeed and the wise men and women in the Congress have agreed on an agenda for change in Kashmir. It involves disbanding the special operations groups (dreaded by both militants and the common people); the non-implementation of POTA in the state; the review of cases of detainees held on ‘non-specific’ charges. These are all fine ideas from a human rights point of view. But let’s cut all that out. The measures tell the militants; thank you, now we’ll go soft on you.

It is here that the new regime in Kashmir needs to remember the miscalculation in Assam. That any favours done are invariably called in.

During the AGP’s first stint in office, the party practically abdicated all power to the ULFA. For the people of the state, nothing could have been worse. The first thing they faced was extortion demands. In those days, the ULFA didn’t brook any bargaining. If a businessman or planter mumbled anything about a discount, they would simply double the demand.

Then there was the sight of ULFA cadres roaming around aimlessly (they had no government to fight) in figures, brandishing guns, dealing instant justice when they were bored.

The honeymoon couldn’t last. Eventually, Prime Minister Chandra Shekhar stepped in and dismissed the AGP government in 1990.

By 1996, chastened by a resounding defeat in 1991, the AGP felt the time was ripe for a second honeymoon. The problem was that the ULFA, hit hard by two army operations and a large number of surrenders, expected at least the same sort of treatment that it got from its political partners the first time.

When the AGP couldn’t deliver; the relationship turned sour. The ULFA began to refer to AGP leaders as ‘traitors’. They tried to kill Mahanta and senior minister Biraj Sarma. But Nagen Sarma, one of the ministers who had signed those pre-election agreements, ran out of luck. He, along with innumerable nameless AGP cadres, was killed.

The brand of militancy in Kashmir is admittedly different. For one, ‘indigenous’ groups like the Hizbul Mujahideen don’t depend on local money to fight their war-the ISI takes care of that. But militants need several things that a local administration can provide: safe passage, safe houses and, most of all, the government’s indifference, if not encouragement. These they are bound to expect.

Which brings us to Sayeed’s dilemma: let the militants have a free run and expect a breakdown of law and order; or don’t and be sure to make yourself bulletproof.

Sayeed has three years as the chief minister, but possibly a little less time to resolve the above dilemma. Good luck to him.

(Source: Hindustan Times)

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